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ABSTRACT Encryption technologies have become one of the most prevalent solutions to safeguard
data confidentiality in many real-world applications, e.g., cloud-based data storage systems. Encryption
outputting a relatively ‘‘static’’ format of encrypted data, however, may hinder further data operations.
For example, encrypted data may need to be ‘‘transformed’’ into other formats for computation or other
purposes. To enable encryption to be used in another device equipped with a different encryptionmechanism,
the concept of encryption switching was first proposed in CRYPTO 2016 for conversion particularly between
Paillier and ElGamal encryptions. This paper considers the conversion between conventional identity-based
and attribute-based encryptions and further proposes a concrete construction via the technique of proxy re-
encryption. The construction is proved to be CPA secure in the standard model under q-decisional parallel
bilinear Diffie–Hellman exponent assumption. The performance comparisons highlight that our bridging
mechanism reduces computation and communication cost on the client side, especially when the data of the
client is encrypted and outsourced to a remote cloud. The computational costs with respect to re-encryption
(on the server side) and decryption (on the client side) are acceptable in practice.
INDEX TERMS Data security, encryption switching, identity-based encryption, attribute-based encryption,
CPA security, standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
An interesting and useful primitive of public key cryptog-
raphy, which is called encryption switching protocol (ESP),
has been introduced in CRYPTO 2016 by Couteau et al. [1].
The basic idea behind ESP is to build a ‘‘bridge’’ between an
ElGamal-like ciphertext and a Paillier encryption [2] in such
a way that the two different encryptions can transfer from
one to the other. For instance, given an encryption of Paillier,
ESP can be used to convert the ciphertext to ElGamal-like
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zheng Yan.
encryption under the same plaintext, and furthermore, it can-
not leak the underlying plaintext in encryption conversion
phase. The initial motivation of the design of ESP is to bring
convenience and scalability in the transformation between
homomorphic computations (+ and×), so that even a garbled
circuit with only + (resp. ×) gates is able to take ElGamal-
like (resp. Paillier) encryption as input.
Inspired by the seminal notion, this paper explores the
concept of ESP into more general context of public key
encryption (PKE). As advanced versions of PKE, identity-
based encryption (IBE) [3] and attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [4] have been introduced in the literature to enhance
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fine-grained data sharing by allowing the data encryptor
to encrypt data under the ‘‘fuzzy’’ information of the data
receiver. Furthermore, ABE also supports one-to-many data
sharing mode in the sense that the data owner only needs to
generate an encryption intended for a group of users specified
by some descriptions, so that the users can leverage respec-
tive decryption keys to reveal the underlying plaintext. Both
cryptographic primitives can be implemented in many real-
world applications, such as Voltage,1 Secure Zones [5] and
Andraben [6].
Motivation: Suppose a local tax authority may send an
email to contact a tax payer, say Alice, to ask for necessary
documents (e.g., bank details and income) to check if Alice
has committed fraud in a tax report. If there is a sender address
in the email, Alicemay encrypt an audit log of personal online
bank transactions under the address for the authority. Upon
the arrival of the encrypted message, the gateway of the tax
authority may recognize it in order to send the encryption
to the most appropriate officials. To do so, the gateway has
to decrypt the ciphertext and further re-encrypt it under, say
the email address of Bob (who is the official at the tax audit
department). If Alice cannot see the address of the sender
in the email (note this is quite common in practice, known
as ‘‘No-Reply’’ email), she may encrypt the file under the
descriptions of the authority, for example, (‘‘Tax Authority’’
AND ‘‘London Area’’ AND (‘‘Audit Dept.’’ OR ‘‘Others’’)),
and further upload the encryption to the authority online. The
gateway of the tax authority may do nothing but broadcast
the encryption within the internal network. To shorten the
response time of handling each auditing case, the gateway
may reform the ciphertext intended for specified officials by
decrypting the message and re-encrypting under the officials’
email addresses. However, both of the above approaches leak
sensitive personal information to the gateway.
We may also consider a scenario where a communication
channel can only support a special type of encrypted mes-
sage, say IBE, due to the control of communication band-
width. However, an ABE ciphertext requests to go through
the channel to reach another network domain. Without a
secure ciphertext convertor, the gateway of the channel has to
decrypt themessage to fulfil the transformation of encryption.
How to allow one to securely convert the ciphertexts without
gaining access to the underlying plaintext that motivates this
work.
The conversion between encryptions with different
domains may bring convenience in data analysis and com-
munication. For instance, in the context of big data aggre-
gation, a data collector may receive various formats of data
from many sources. It is challenging for the collector to
aggregate the data if they are encrypted in different domains.
A naive way of data aggregation here is first to request all
the data sources to provide decryption keys and further to
fulfil expensive decryption. But this method requires sharing
1https://www.voltage.com/technology/data-encryption/identity-based-
encryption/
of the secret keys, which can lead to potential data security
breach to the data sources.How to allow one to securely share
data without sharing secret key is also a motivation of our
work.
Under the umbrella of EPS, this paper considers the con-
version between IBE and ABE.
Difficulty: It is challenging to achieve our goal - designing
an encryption switching scheme to bridge IBE and ABE
via proxy re-encryption (PRE) technique. In the literature,
only Mizuno and Doi [7] have proposed an ABE → IBE
type PRE construction that is able to convert a ciphertext
in the format of ABE to an IBE encryption. The scheme,
however, cannot achieve the conversion for the other way
round, i.e. converting an IBE ciphertext to an ABE encryp-
tion. Besides, reference [7] only supports AND gates on pos-
itive and negative attributes w.r.t. ABE encryption, which
offers low expressiveness. The construction proposed in this
paper will not be limited to the above issues. Yet, the main
difficulty depends on how to construct re-encryption key to
(i) enable bilateral conversion and (ii) minimize the effect
expressiveness (in terms of ABE). In order to construct a re-
encryption key we usually need to input the secret/private key
of a delegator (i.e. original data owner) and the public key
information (or ID, attributes) of a delegatee (i.e. the data
receiver after conversion). Here, we give the re-encryption
key construction in [7] as an example whereby gα1 and gat are
parts of the private key of delegator and meanwhile ID is the
public identity of delegatee. However, the part gα1gat (gIDh)w
is the hindrance to prevent the conversion from IBE to ABE.
To bypass this hindrance, in our construction, we design a re-
encryption key from the private key of delegator and a partial
private key of delegatee. The re-encryption key actually con-
tains the delegator’s private key and an IBE ciphertext. When
being used to convert an ABE ciphertext to an IBE one, the re-
encryption algorithm runs the ABE decryption and further
outputs the decryption results which is an IBE ciphertext.
In this case, we must guarantee that, given a re-encryption
key, proxy cannot obtain any information of the underling
plaintext, even if it colludes with the corresponding delegatee
(who is without knowledge of the delegator’s private key).
To achieve the guarantee, we randomize the private keys of
both delegator and delegatee. Besides, we require that the
hard assumptions of the underlying ABE and IBE should be
the same or at least, have an inclusive relationship.
Identity-Based Encryption: Identity-based cryptography is
a general extension of public-key cryptography where the
public key of a user can be any arbitrary string uniquely rep-
resenting the identity of the user (e.g. name or email address).
In 1984, Shamir first proposed the concept of IBE [3].
Till 2001, the first construction of IBE was constructed
by Boneh and Franklin [8] by using Weil pairing. How-
ever, the security proof is based on the random oracle
model. In 2004, Boneh and Boyen presented an IBE scheme
with IND-ID-CPA security in the standard model [9], and
later Waters [10] proposed a more efficient IBE scheme.
Since its introduction, IBE has been explored to support
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TABLE 1. Comparison with Related Works.
various features, e.g., anonymous IBE [11], [12], hierarchical
IBE [13], identity-based broadcast encryption [14] and revo-
cable IBE [15].
Attribute-Based Encryption: ABE is an extension of IBE.
It allows private key and ciphertext to be labeled with
descriptions, so that a decryption is valid if and only if the
description of a decryption key matches that of a ciphertext.
It has been widely employed in fine-grained data access
control. There are two important variants of ABE, one is key-
policy ABE (KP-ABE) [4] relating access control policy to
decryption key, and the other is ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-
ABE) [16], [17] associating ciphertext with access control
policy. Since its introduction, ABE has been extended to
support various features, e.g., large universe ABE [18], [19],
traceable ABE [20], [21] and outsourced ABE [22], [23].
Proxy re-encryption: Blaze et al. [24] introduced the
notion of PRE in the context of PKE. In a PRE system,
a delegator, say Alice, can request a semi-trusted proxy
to transform a ciphertext under her public key to another
ciphertext under the public key of a delegatee, say Bob,
without leaking the underlying information of the plain-
text to the proxy. Some variants of traditional PRE have
been proposed in the literature (e.g. [25]–[27]). In 2007,
Green and Ateniese [28] explored PRE in the context of
IBE and further introduced the notion of the identity-based
PRE (IBPRE). To implement PRE in the attribute-based
cryptographic setting, Liang et al. [29] defined CP-ABPRE,
and proposed a concrete construction on top of [30]. Fol-
lowing the seminal work, ABPRE have been proposed to
achieve better security and more expressiveness in data
sharing [31].
However, all the aforementioned schemes cannot support
encryption switching. A hybrid proxy PREwas first proposed
by Matsuo [32] in 2007 to enable a PKE ciphertext to be
converted to an IBE one. Later, Mizuno and Doi [7] pro-
posed a PRE conversion from ABE to IBE while maintaining
the confidentiality of plaintext. Recently, Couteau et al. [1]
introduced an encryption switching between Paillier and
ElGamal based on homomorphic encryption. We compare
our construction with [1], [7], [9], [17], and [32] in terms of
functionality, security and feature in Table 1. The details of
efficiency analysis will be given in Section 5. We state that
our scheme is the first of its type to achieve bidirectional
conversion between ABE and IBE with CPA security in the
standard model.
A. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the complexity assumption, definitions and
security notion used in this paper. In Section 3 we present
the construction. In Section 4, we give the security proof.
In Section 5, we compare our work with other related works
in terms of efficiency. In Section 6, we present the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BILINEAR GROUPS AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
Two multiplicative cyclic groupsG andGT whose orders are
prime p and a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT has the following
three properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for all g, h ∈ G and
a, b ∈ Zp.
• Non-degeneracy: There exist g, h ∈ G such that
e(g, h) 6= 1G.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(g, h) for all g, h ∈ G.
Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent
Assumption [17]. Given a group G of prime order p, let
a, s, b1, · · · , bq ∈R Zp and g be a generator of G. If an
algorithm is given −→y = g, gs, ga, · · · , gaq , , gaq+2 , · · · , ga2q
∀1 ≤ j ≤ q gs·bj , ga/bj , · · · , gaq/bj , , gaq+2/bj , · · · , ga2q/bj
∀1 ≤ j, k ≤ q, k 6= j ga·s·bk/bj , · · · , gaq·s·bk/bj
It is hard to distinguish e(g, g)a
q+1s ∈ GT from a random
element in GT .
The advantage ε of an adversary A to solve decisional q-
parallel BDHE if
|Pr[A(−→y ,T ]=e(g, g)aq+1s)=0]−Pr[A(−→y ,T =R)=0]|≥ε
B. DEFINITION OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
Definition 1: An attribute-based encryption (ABE) usu-
ally consists of four algorithms.
ABE.Setup(λ,U ): intake a security parameter λ and descrip-
tion universe, output the public parameters PK and a master
key MSK . We assume that PK is implicitly seen as input for
the following algorithms.
ABE.KeyGen(MSK ,A): intake the master key MSK and a
description A, output a private key SK .
ABE.Encrypt(M,B): intake a message M, and a descrip-
tion B, output a ciphertext CT .
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ABE.Decrypt(CT , SK ): intake a ciphertext CT which con-
tains a description A, and a private key SK corresponding to
another description B. If Bmatches A the algorithm decrypts
the ciphertext and returns a messageM; otherwise, return⊥.
While A is a set of attributes over U and B is an access
policy, the definition is for KP-ABE; if the case is the other
way round, that is for CP-ABE.
C. DEFINITION OF IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Definition 2: Following Definition 1, if we set A = B as
an identity of a system user, we have the definition for IBE.
D. DEFINITION OF ENCRYPTION SWITCHING
We here define a general ciphertext conversion framework
between ABE and IBE.
Definition 3: Following Definition 1 and 2, we have the
definition of encryption switching (ES):
ES.Setup(λ,U ): (ABE .PK ,ABE .MSK ) ← ABE.Setup(λ,
U ) and (IBE .PK , IBE .MSK )← IBE.Setup(λ,U ). Set PK =
(ABE .PK , IBE .PK ) and MSK = (ABE .MSK , IBE .MSK ).
We note that λ is the same security parameter and the
ABE .PK , IBE .PK could be held by two distinct trusted par-
ties, respectively.
ES.KeyGen(MSK ,A): SKA ← δ.KeyGen(MSK ,A), where
δ ∈ {ABE , IBE} and A ∈ {an attribute set,
anaccess policy, an identity}.
ES.ReKeyGen(A,B, SKA, SKB): intake the descriptions A,
B and private keys SKA, SKB, output a re-encryption key
RKA→B, where A and B are from distinct encryption mecha-
nisms, e.g., A ∈ {an attribute set, an access policy} and B is
an identity.
ES.Encrypt(M,A): CTA ← δ.Encryption(M,A).
We assume that ABE and IBE share the same message
domain in the definition.
ES.ReEncrypt(CTA,RKA→B): intake a ciphertext CTA
under the description A and a re-encryption key RKA→B,
output a re-encrypted ciphertext CTB.
ES.Decrypt(CT , SK ):M/ ⊥← δ.Decrypt(CT , SK ).
Note that we assume the above conversion definition
between ABE and IBE should share the same message
domainM (so that the conversion can be executed smoothly).
E. SECURITY MODEL OF ENCRYPTION SWITCHING
ABE↔IBE IN GAME-BASED FRAMEWORK
The selectively chosen plaintext security against ABE→IBE
type ES is defined as the following game between an attacker
A and a challenger C. The game describes the security of
the underlying ABE and IBE scheme even if A achieves re-
encryption keys which can transform the ciphertext of ABE
to the one of IBE.
Init. A chooses a target access structure A∗ and a target IBE
identity ID∗, and sends them to C.
Setup. C runs SetupA(1κ ) and SetupI (1κ ), and returns ABE
public parameters and IBE public parameters to the A.
Phase 1. A is allowed to adaptively issue ABE private
key queries, IBE private key queries and re-encryption key
queries as follows:
• ExtractA(S) :A can adaptively and repeatedly request an
ABE private key for a set S where S 6|H A∗.
• ExtractI (ID, params): A can adaptively and repeatedly
issue an IBE private key corresponding to an identity ID
of his choice.
• ExtractA→I (S, ID): A can adaptively and repeatedly
request re-encryption key which can transform ABE
ciphertexts encrypted for set S to IBE ciphertexts cor-
responding to an identity ID. (It is only with the security
of [ABE-IBE] type proxy re-encryption scheme)
Challenge.A submits two equal length messagesM0 andM1
and selects which scheme to attack (ABE or IBE). C randomly
chooses β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the encrypted result of Mβ
encrypted by the selected scheme.
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
Guess. A submits a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β ′ = β, A wins.
During Phase 1 and 2, A is restricted to the following
queries:
• ExtractA(S), where S |H A∗.
• ExtractI (ID∗).
• ExtractA→I (S∗, ID) and ExtractI (ID, param) queries,
where S |H A∗ and ID is an arbitrary IBE user’s identity.
Remark: The selectively chosen plaintext security against
IBE→ABE type ES is similar to the above security game
except the queries of re-encryption key ExtractI→A(ID, S)
where the re-encryption key transforms IBE under an identity
ID to ABE under a description S.
Definition 4: We define A’s advantage in the above game
as AdvA(1κ ) = 2Pr[β ′ = β]−1. We state that an ABE→IBE
(resp. IBE→ABE) type ES is indistinguishable under selec-
tively chosen plaintext attacks, if for any probabilistic poly-
nomial time (PPT) adversaryA, the advantage in the security
game is negligible.
III. CONSTRUCTIONS
A. BUILDING BLOCKS REVIEW
Our ES between ABE and IBE is built on top of Waters-ABE
scheme [17] and the first construction of BB-IBE [9]. We are
going to review them as follows.
Waters-ABEConstruction.Waters-ABE consists of the fol-
lowing four algorithms [17].
Setup(λ,U ). Let U be the maximum number of system
attributes. LetG,GT be a bilinear group of prime order p. Let
e : G × G → GT . Then, it chooses a generator g as well as
random group elements h1, · · · , hU ∈ G that are associated
with the U attributes in the system. In addition, it chooses
random exponents α1, a ∈ Zp. The public key is
PK1 = g, e(g, g)α1 , ga, h1, · · · , hU .
The master private key is MSK1 = gα1 .
Encrypt(PK1,M, (M , ρ)). It takes as input the public
parameters PK1, a message M as well as an LSSS access
structure (M , ρ), where M be an ` × n matrix and ρ asso-
ciates rows of M to attributes. It first chooses a vector
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Ev = (s, y2, · · · , yn) ∈R Znp. These values will be used to
share the encryption exponent s. For i = 1 to `, it calculates
λi = Ev · Mi, where Mi is the vector corresponding to the ith
row of M . Then it chooses r1, · · · , r` ∈R Zp and computes
the ciphertext as follows:
C =M · e(g, g)α1 s,
C ′ = gs, {Ci = gaλih−riρ(i), Di = gri}i∈{1,··· ,`}
The ciphertext is CTS = (C,C ′, {Ci,Di}ρ(i)∈M ) along with a
description of (M , ρ).
KeyGen(MSK1, S). It takes as input the master private key
MSK1 and a set S of attributes. It chooses t ∈R Zp and creates
the private key SKS = (K ,L, {Kx}x∈S ) as
K = gα1gat , L = gt , ∀x ∈ S : Kx = htx
Decrypt(CT , SKS ). It takes as input a ciphertext CT for a
linear access structure (M , ρ) and a private key SKS . Suppose
that S satisfies the access structure and let I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , `}
be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a
set of constants such that if {λi} are valid shares of any secret
s according to M , then
∑
i∈I wiλi = s. It computes
M = C ·
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci,L)e(Di,Kρ(i))
)wi
e(C ′,K )
= M · e(g, g)
α1 s ·∏i∈I e(g, g)aλiwit
e(g, g)α1 se(g, g)ast
BB-IBE.We review BB-IBE [9] construction as follows.
Setup(λ). Let G,GT be a bilinear group of prime order p,
and e : G × G → GT be the bilinear map. Given a security
parameter λ as input, the algorithm selects a generator g0 ∈R
G and h, g2 ∈R G. It picks α2 ∈R Zp and sets g1 = gα20 . The
public parameters are PK2 = (g0, g1, g2, h) and the master
private key is MSK2 = α2.
Encrypt(ID,PK2,M). Given an identity ID, public parame-
ter PK2 and plaintextM ∈ GT as input, the algorithm selects
w ∈R Zp and outputs an IBE ciphertext CTID.
CTID = (C1,C2,C3) = (gw0 , (gID1 h)w,Me(g1, g2)w)
KeyGen(MSK2,PK2, ID). Given master private key MSK2,
public parameters PK2 and an identity ID as input, the algo-
rithm picks u ∈R Zp and outputs an IBE private key as
SKID = (SK 1ID, SK 2ID) = (gα22 (gID1 h)u, gu0).
Decrypt(SKID,CTID). Given an IBE private key SKID and
an IBE ciphertext CTID as input, the algorithm outputs a
plaintextM.
M = C3 · e(SK
2
ID,C2)
e(SK 1ID,C1)
B. CONSTRUCTION: ABE→IBE TYPE ES
Based on the above ABE and IBE schemes, we design
an ES via PRE technique which converts the encryp-
tion of ABE to that of IBE scheme. We define that
ES.Setup =[Setup(λ,U ), Setup(λ)], ES.KeyGen =
[KeyGen(MSK1, S), KeyGen(MSK2,PK2, ID)], and ES.
Encrypt = [Encrypt(PK1, M, (M , ρ)), Encrypt(ID, PK2,
M)]. The main technique we introduce here is to build a
plug-in to convert two types of encryption, so that we only
focus on the algorithms related to the conversion, namely
ES.ReKenGen, ES.ReEncrypt and ES.Decrypt. For the setup,
key generation and encryption, one may use the respective
algorithm depending on which encryption domain he/she
is currently in, for example, one may use the algorithm
Encrypt(ID, PK2, M) to encrypt data if he/she is in the
context of IBE.
ES.ReKenGenA→I (PK1,PK2, S, ID, SKS , SK 2ID): Given the
ABE and IBE public parameter PK1 and PK2, attribute set
S and a delegator B’s ABE private key SKS , a delegatee A’s
IBE identity ID and its 2nd component of private key SK 2ID
as input, the algorithm outputs a re-encryption key RKA→I =
(Ra,Rb,Rc,Rd , rk1, {rkx}x∈S ) as follows:
• Client A chooses u′ ∈R Zp and computes SK 2ID′ = SK 2ID ·
gu
′
0 = gu
′′
0 , where u + u′ = u′′. Then client A returns
SK 2ID
′
to client B and keeps secret u′ which is needed in
the decryption algorithm.
• Client B selects t ′ ∈R Zp and sets
Ra = K · gat ′ · SK 2ID′ = gα1gat
′′
gu
′′
0 .
Client B selects τ ∈R Zp and sets
Rb = gτ0, Rc = (gID1 h)τ , Rd = e(g1, g2)τ .
Client B computes rk1 = L · gt ′ = gt ′′ .
For each attribute x ∈ S: rkx = Kx · ht ′x = ht ′′x , where
t + t ′ = t ′′.
ES.ReEncryptA→I (RKA→I ,CTS ): Given attribute set S,
identity ID, a re-encryption key RKA→I and an ABE cipher-
text CTS = (C,C ′, {Ci,Di}ρ(i)∈M ) along with a descrip-
tion of (M ,ρ) as input, output an IBE ciphertext CTID =
(C1,C2,C3) as follows:
Suppose S satisfies the access structure (M , ρ) and let I ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let {wi ∈
Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid shares
of any secret s according to M , then
∑
i∈I
wiλi = s. Compute
C ′i = e(Ci, rk1)e(rki,Di) = e(g, g)aλit
′′
.
Select y ∈R Zp and compute:
C1 = Ryb = gτy0
C2 = Ryc · C ′ = (gID1 h)τy · gs
C3 = C · R
y
d ·
∏
i∈I C ′i wi
e(C ′,Ra)
=M · e(g1, g2)
τy
e(gs, gu
′′
0 )
ES.Decrypt(PK2,CTID, SKID): Given IBE public parame-
ters PK2, ciphertext CTID and private key SKID of identity
ID, client A uses u′ and computes
M = C3 · e(SK
2
ID · gu
′
0 ,C2)
e
(
SK 1ID · (gID1 h)u′ ,C1
)
= M · e(g1, g2)
τye(gu
′′
0 , (g
ID
1 h)
τy · gs)
e(gs, gu
′′
0 )e
(
gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
u(gID1 h)
u′ , gτy0
)
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C. IBE→ABE TYPE ES
We further design IBE→ABE Type ES which converts
ciphertexts of IBE to ABE format as follows. Similarly,
we focus on the algorithms supporting ciphertext conversion.
ES.ReKenGenI→A(PK1,PK2, S, ID, SKID, SKS ): Given
ABE and IBE public parameter PK1 and PK2, attribute set S
and a delegator B’s ABE private key SKS , a delegatee’s IBE
identity ID and an IBE user A’s private key SKID as input,
output a re-encryption key RKI→A = (Ra,Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ ,
Rd , rk1, rk2) as follows:
• Client B chooses t ′ ∈R Zp and computes K ′ = K ·gat ′ =
gα1gat
′′
, where t + t ′ = t ′′. Client B sends K ′ to client
A and keeps secret t ′ which is needed in the decryption
algorithm.
• Client A selects u′ ∈R Zp and sets
Ra = SK 1ID · (gID1 h)u
′ · K ′ = gα22 (gID1 h)u
′′
gα1gat
′′
Client A selects τ ∈R Zp and sets Rb = gτ .
Let M ′ be an ` × n matrix. The algorithm chooses a
random vector Ev′ = (τ, y′2, · · · , y′n) ∈ Znp, which will
be used to share the encryption exponent τ .
For i = 1 to `, it calculates λ′i = Ev′ ·M ′i , whereM ′i is the
vector corresponding to the ith row of M ′. In addition,
it chooses random r ′i ∈ Zp and computes
Rci = {Ci = gaλ′ih−r
′
i
ρ(i), Di = gr
′
i }, Rd = e(g, g)α1τ
Client A chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = sk2ID · gu
′
0 · gδ0 = gu
′′+δ
0 , rk2 = (gID1 h)δ
ES.ReEncryptI→A(RKI→A,CTID): Given a re-encryption
key RKI→A = (Ra,, Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ , Rd , rk1, rk2}) and an
IBE ciphertext CTID = (C1,C2,C3) as input, output an ABE
ciphertext CTS = ({C1i}ρ(i)∈M ′ ,C2,C3,C4) as follows:
C = e (C2, rk1)
e (C1, rk2)
=
e
(
(gID1 h)
w, gu
′′+δ
0
)
e
(
gw0 , (g
ID
1 h)
δ
) = e ((gID1 h)w, gu′′0 )
Chooses y ∈ Zp, for ρ(i) ∈ M ′i , compute
C1i = Ryci
= {Ci = Ciy = (gaλ′ih−r
′
i
ρ(i))
y,Di = Dyi = (gr
′
i )y}
C2 = Ryb · C1 = gτy · gw0
C3 = Ryd = e(g, g)α1τy
C4 = C3 · Ce(Ra,C1) =
M · e(g1, g2)w · e
(
(gID1 h)
w, gu
′′
0
)
e
(
gα22 (g
ID
1 h)
u′′ · gα1gat ′′ , gw0
)
= M
e(gα1gat ′′ , gw0 )
ES.Decrypt(CTS , SKS ): Given ciphertext CTS and private
key SKS , let I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈
S}. Then, let {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that
if {λ′i} are valid shares of any secret τ according to M , then∑
i∈I
wiλ′i = τ .
The decryption algorithm uses t ′ and computes
M =
C4 · e
(
C2,K · gat ′
)
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci,L · gt ′ ) · e(Di,Kρ(i) · ht ′ρ(i))
)wi · C3
=
M · e
(
gτygw0 , g
α1gat
′′)
e(gα1gat ′′ , gw0 ) ·
(∏
i∈I
e(g, g)t
′′ayλ′iwi
)
· e(g, g)α1τy
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first prove that our ABE→IBE type ES is indistinguish-
able under selectively chosen plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA),
if the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds.
Theorem 1: Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE
assumption holds, our ABE→IBE type ES is IND-sCPA
secure with a challenge matrix of size `∗ × n∗, where
`∗, n∗ ≤ q.
Proof: Suppose we have an adversary A with non-
negligible advantage against the ABE→IBE type ES.
We construct an algorithm B which can solve the decisional
q-parallel BDHE problem by using A.
Init. A chooses a target access structure A∗ and a target
identity ID∗, and sends them to B.
Setup. B Setup simulation as follows:
ABE Setup. B chooses α′ ∈R Zp and implicitly sets α =
α′ + aq+1 by letting
e(g, g)α1 = e(ga, gaq )e(g, g)α′ .
For each attribute x ∈ U , B chooses a values zx ∈R Zp. Let
X denote the set of indices i, such that ρ∗(i) = x, B sets
hx = gzx
∏
i∈X
gaM
∗
i,1/bi · ga2M∗i,2/bi · · · gan
∗
M∗i,n∗/bi .
Note that if X = 8 then sets hx = gzx . B sends the public
parameters g, e(g, g)α1 , ga, {hx}ρ∗(i)∈U to A.
IBE-Setup. B chooses z1, z2, z3 ∈R Z∗p and sets g0 = g, g1 =
gaz1 , g2 = gaqz2 , h = g−ID∗1 gz3 . B sets the master private key
MSK = az1. B sends the public parameters g0, g1, g2, h to
A.
Phase 1. A adaptively interacts with B as follows:
• ExtractA(S). A queries the ABE private key SKS with a
set S, where S 6|H A∗.
B first finds a vector −→w = (w1, · · · ,wn∗ ) ∈ Zp such
that w1 = −1 and for all i where ρ∗(i) ∈ S we have that−→w ·M∗i = 0. Then B chooses r ∈R Zp.
B defines t = r + w1aq + w2aq−1 + · · · + wn∗aq−n∗+1.
It lets
L = gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(
ga
q+1−i)wi = gt .
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B computesK = gα′gar ∏i=2,··· ,n∗ (gaq+2−i)wi . For x ∈
S and there is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, B defines Kx =
Lzx .
For x ∈ S and let X be the set of all i such that ρ∗(i) = x,
B defines
Kx = Lzx
∏
i∈X
∏
j=(1,n∗)
g aj·rbi ∏
k=(1,n∗)
k 6=j
(
ga
q+1+j−k/bi
)wk

M∗i,j
B returns SKS to A and records the tuple (S, SKS ) in an
ABE private key List (ASKL).
• ExtractI (ID).A queries the IBE user’s private key SKID
with an identity ID.
– If ID = ID∗, B rejects.
– If ID 6= ID∗, B checks the list of REKL, and if
there exits the re-encryption key to ID and S |H
W , B rejects. Otherwise, B chooses u ∈R Zp and
computes
SK 1ID = g
−aqz2z3
(ID−ID∗)
(
gaz1(ID−ID∗)gz3
)u
,
SK 2ID = g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu
B returns SKID = (SK 1ID, SK 2ID) to A and records the
tuple (ID, SKID) in an IBE private key list (ISKL).
• ExtractA→I (S, ID). A queries the re-encryption key
from attribute set S to identity ID as follows:
If S 6|H M∗: B runs ExtractA(S) and obtains an ABE
private key SKS = (K ,L, {Kx}x∈S ).
– When ID 6= ID∗, B sets the re-encryption key
RKI→A = (Ra,Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ ,Rd , rk1, rk2}) as
follows:
Select t ′, u′ ∈R Zp and set
Ra = K · gat ′ · SK 2ID · gu
′ = K · gat ′g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) · gu′ .
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = gτ ,
Rc = (gaz1(ID−ID∗)gz3 )τ ,
Rd = e(ga, gaq )τ .
Compute rk1 = L · gt ′ and for each x ∈ S,
rkx = Kx · ht ′x .
– When ID = ID∗, B chooses t ′, u′′ ∈R Zp and
computes
Ra = K · gat ′ · gu′′ = K · gat ′ · gu′′ .
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = gτ , Rc = gz3τ , Rd = e(ga, gaq )τ .
Compute rk1 = L · gt ′ and for each x ∈ S,
rkx = Kx · ht ′x .
Otherwise S |H M∗: If B already answers IBE private
key for ID, B rejects. Otherwise, does as follows:
– When ID 6= ID∗, B chooses t ′′, u ∈ Zp and
computes
Ra = gα′gatg
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu.
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = gτ ,
Rc =
(
gaz1(ID−ID∗)gz3
)τ
,
Rd = e
(
ga, ga
q
)τ
.
Compute rk1 = gt ′′ , {rkx = ht ′′x }x∈S .
Remark:
Ra = gα′gat ′′g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu
= gα′+aq+1gat ′′g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu−aq+1
= gαgatgat ′g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu1gu
′
= K · gat ′ · SK 2ID · gu
′
where t + t ′ = t ′′, u = −aqz2(ID−ID∗) + u1, u1 + u′ =
u− aq+1.
– When ID = ID∗,B chooses t, u ∈ Zp and computes
Ra = gα′gatgu.
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = (gz3 )τ , Rc = gτ , Rd = e(ga, gaq )τ .
Compute rk1 = gt and for each x ∈ S, rkx = htx .
B returns RKA→I to A and records the tuple
(S,ID,RKA→I ) in re-encryption key list (REKL).
Challenge. A submits two equal length plaintexts
M0,M1 ∈ GT and chooses which scheme to attack. B flips
a coins β.
If A selects ABE scheme to attack, B builds the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗A = (C∗,C
′∗, {C∗x ,D∗x}ρ(x)∗∈M∗ )
C∗ =Mβ · T · e(gs, gα′ ), C ′ = gs
B chooses y′2, · · · , y′n∗ and the share the secret using the
vector
−→v = (s, sa+ y′2, sa2 + y′3, · · · , san−1 + y′n∗ ) ∈ Zn
∗
p
B chooses r ′1, · · · , r ′` ∈ Zp. For i = 1, · · · , n∗, let Ri as the
set of all k 6= i such that ρ∗(i) = ρ∗(k) meaning the same
attributes as row i.
B computes
Di = g−r ′i g−sbi
Ci = hr
′
i
ρ∗(i)
 ∏
j=2,··· ,n∗
(ga)M
∗
i,jy
′
j
 (gbi·s)−zρ∗(i)
·
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
j·s·(bi/bk ))M
∗
k,j

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IfA selects IBE scheme to attack,B outputs an IBE challenge
ciphertext CT ∗ = (C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ) corresponding to a target
identity ID∗ as follows:
C∗1 = Mβ · T , C∗2 = gs, C∗3 = gsz3
Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β ′ = β then B
outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g)aq+1s; otherwise, it outputs 0 to
indicate T is a random group element in GT .
Theorem 2: Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE
assumption holds, the IBE→ABE type ES is IND-sCPA
secure with a challenge matrix of size `∗×n∗, where `∗, n∗ ≤
q.
Proof: The security of IBE→ABE type ES is similar
to that of ABE→IBE type ES except the re-encryption key
queries ExtractI→A(ID, S). Therefore, we just present the re-
encryption key queries as follows.
ExtractI→A(S, ID) A queries the re-encryption key from
identity ID to attribute set S as follows:
If ID 6= ID∗: B runs ExtractI (ID) and obtains an IBE private
key SKID = (SK 1ID, SK 2ID).
• S 6|H M∗:B runsExtractA(S) and obtains an ABE private
key SKS = (K ,L, {Kx}x∈S ). B uses SKID and SKS to
generate RKI→A = (Ra,Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ , Rd , rk1, rk2}).
• S |H M∗: B chooses t, t ′′, u′ ∈R Zp and computes
Ra = SK 1ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3 )u
′ · gα′gatgat ′′
Remark:
Ra = SK 1ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3 )u
′ · gα′gatgat ′′
= SK 1ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3 )u
′ · gα′+aq+1gatga(t ′′−aq)
= SK 1ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3 )u
′ · gα1gatga(t ′′−aq)
= SK 1ID · (gID1 h)u
′ · K · gat ′
B selects τ ∈R Zp and sets Rb = gτ .
Let M∗ be an ` × n matrix. The algorithm first chooses a
random vector Ev∗ = (τ, y∗2, · · · , y∗n) ∈ Znp. These values will
be used to share the encryption exponent τ .
For i = 1 to `, it calculates λ∗i = Ev∗ · M∗i , where M∗i is
the vector corresponding to the ith row of M∗. In addition,
the algorithm chooses random r∗i ∈ Zp and computes
Rci = {Ci = gaλ∗i h−r
∗
i
ρ(i) , Di = gr
∗
i
Rd =
(
e(ga, ga
q
) · e(g, g)α′
)τ
B chooses δ ∈R Zp and computes rk1 = sk2ID ·gu
′ ·gδ, rk2 =
(gaz1(ID−ID∗)gz3 )δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
If ID = ID∗:
• S 6|H M∗: If B already answers ABE private key for S,
B rejects. Otherwise, does as follows:
B runs ExtractA(S) to generate K , then it chooses
t ′′, u′′ ∈ Zp and computes Ra = gz3(u′′) · K · gat ′′ .
Remark:
Ra = gz3u′′ · K · gat ′′
= gaq+1z1z2gz3(u+u′) · K · ga(t ′′−aqz1z2)
= gα22 (gID
∗
1 g
−ID∗
1 g
z3 )(u+u′) · K · gat ′
= gα22 (gID
∗
1 h)
u(gID
∗
1 h)
u′ · K · gat ′
where t ′ = t ′′ − aqz1z2.
B generates {Rci}ρ(i)∈M∗ and Rd as the case when S |H
M∗ and ID 6= ID∗. B chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = gu′′+δ, rk2 = gz3δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
• S |H M∗: B chooses t ′′, u′′ ∈ Zp and computes Ra =
gz3(u
′′) · gα′gat · gat ′′ .
Remark:
Ra = gz3u′′ · gα′gat · gat ′′
= gaq+1z1z2gz3(u+u′) · gα′+aq+1gat · ga(t ′′−aqz1z2−aq)
= gα22 (gID
∗
1 g
−ID∗
1 g
z3 )(u+u′) · K · gat ′
= gα22 (gID
∗
1 h)
u(gID
∗
1 h)
u′ · K · gat ′
where t ′ = t ′′ − aqz1z2 − aq.
B generates {Rci}ρ(i)∈M∗ and Rd as the case when S |H
M∗ and ID 6= ID∗. B chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = gu′′+δ, rk2 = gz3δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we present the theoretical analysis of our
construction in terms of computation, communication and
storage complexity. In the analysis, we consider the following
operations: Ep denotes the computation in bilinear pairings,
Ee denotes the exponentiation computation, |GT | is the size
of group GT , |G1| is the size of group G, and s is the number
of user’s attributes, respectively.
Table 2 presents the comparison of efficiency between
two approaches, one being the naive decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt
method, and the other being our ABE→IBE type ES. The
naive solution is the one where a client first downloads the
encrypted data in the format of ABE from cloud server,
decrypts the data using ABE secret key, further re-encrypts
the data under IBE format, and eventually uploads the result-
ing encryption to cloud. In the computational complex-
ity, it can be seen from the table that the naive solution
requires the client to consume linear cost in pairings, while
ABE→IBE type ES only costs an Ep on the client side (note
the linear complexity is off-loaded to the cloud). Although the
communication complexity of the two approaches is nearly
identical, the storage cost incurred by ABE→IBE type ES
gets rid of the linear requirement in |G1|. Therefore, we can
state that the new primitive designed in this paper outperforms
the naive solution. We state that the complexity is reduced
in our ES, which makes sense because the ES converts a
complex encryption, ABE, into a much simpler one, IBE.
However, this may not be the case for the conversion from
IBE to ABE. From Table 3, we can see that the complexity of
the two solutions is quite close; a few pairings are reduced in
our IBE→ABE Type ES in the communication and compu-
tation costs. Therefore, we may state that the performance of
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TABLE 2. Comparison between Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt with our ABE→IBE Type ES.
TABLE 3. Comparison between Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt with our IBE→ABE Type ES.
FIGURE 1. Experimental analysis. (a) Keygen time. (b) Reencrypt time. (c) Decryption time.
our solution is still a bit better than that of the naive solution
w.r.t. the conversion from IBE to ABE.
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We make use of bilinear pairings e : G1 × G1 → G2 to
achieve the security level of 80 bits. To simulate the worst
case, we generate ciphertext policies in the form of (S1 and
S2 . . . and Sl) increasing from 10 to 100, where Si is an
attribute. We repeat each instance 20 times and eventually
take the average. The time in the figures is given in millisec-
onds. In the simulation, we use the widely studied crypto-
graphic library MIRACL.2 We run the simulation on an Intel
I7-4770 processor with 3.40 GHz clock frequency and 4 GB
RAM running Windows 7 operating system.
The simulation results (w.r.t. the time spent in compu-
tation) are shown in Fig 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). In the fig-
ures, we let ‘‘ABE-IBE’’ denote the ABE→IBE Type ES
(in Section III-B), ‘‘IBE-ABE’’ denote the IBE→ABE Type
ES (in Section III-C), ‘‘BB-IBE’’ is the first construction
in [9], respectively. The figure 1(a) shows the time spent
in re-encryption key (w.r.t. ABE-IBE and IBE-ABE) and
decryption key (w.r.t. Waters-ABE and BB-IBE) genera-
tion. IBE→ABE Type ES requires the longest time in the
key preparation (nearly 0.52 s), while Waters-ABE and
2https://libraries.docs.miracl.com/miracl-user-manual/installation.
ABE→IBE Type ES share similar time complexity (around
0.18 s). The cost of time for BB-IBE is constant (approxi-
mately 0.01 s) because there is only one attribute, i.e. identity,
embedded into the key. The figure 1(b) is about the complex-
ity of re-encryption in our ESs. It can be seen that IBE-ABE
(nearly 0.4 s) outperforms ABE-IBE (around 0.88 s). This
is so because the re-encryption in the conversion from ABE
to IBE requires the cost of pairings which is linear with
the size of row matching set I (while the re-encryption of
IBE-ABE is in the cost of constant pairings). It is worth
mentioning that the re-encryption burden in our ESs can
be off-loaded to a cloud server. The decryption complexity
comparison is shown in the figure 1(b). The cost of ABE-
IBE and BB-IBE is constant (only using constant number of
pairings), nearly 0.1s, while IBE-ABE suffers from the worst
performance, 2.5 s (due to the fact that two linear groups
of pairings are required in decryption). In general, from the
simulation results shown in the Figures, we can state that the
cost incurred by our ESs is acceptable in practice (with best
case of <1 s and a worst case of 2.5 s).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced encryption switching
between IBE and ABE which is the first of its type in the
literature. The security notion has been defined in the game-
based framework. We have presented a concrete construction
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and meanwhile proved it to be CPA secure in the standard
model under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption. The
efficiency analysis has highlighted that our solution outper-
forms the download-and-re-encrypt conversion mode w.r.t.
computation and communication cost. Finally, the simulation
results have shown that the computational complexity in
terms of re-encryption and decryption (in our construction)
are in the acceptable range, e.g., around 0.9 s and 2.5 s
for ABE→IBE re-encryption and decryption, respectively.
In addition, some interesting open problems have emerged
from this work, such as problem of how to shorten the re-
encrypt and decrypt time in the case of ABE→IBE, and seek
an approach to achieve simulation-based security.
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